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SUBJECT: FM STOERE AND AMBASSADOR WHITNEY ON THE MIDDLE

EAST, RUSSIA AND WHITE HOUSE VISITS

Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Kristen Bauer for reasons  $1.4\ \mathrm{b}$  and d

11. (SBU) SUMMARY: Ambassador Whitney met with Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Stoere on June 15 over lunch and discussed a variety of issues including the Middle East, Afghanistan, Russia and missile defense, a White House visit for Prime Minister Stoltenberg and the New Embassy Compound. END SUMMARY

## MIDDLE EAST

12. (C) The situation in Gaza is a topic of high interest to Stoere and he expressed agreement for U.S. support of Abbas. Stoere felt that the GON's position on normalizing relations with Hamas members of the government has been vindicated because isolation weakened the moderate Hamas elements and strengthened the extremists. He stated that he is not surprised that Hamas would revert to the violence that it knows best, given the failure of the diplomatic path of the New Unity Government. Stoere was pessimistic of any plans for a renewal of the unity government because while Abbas can call for a new government, Hamas would still have to give its approval for a new government to have any chance of effectiveness. This is unlikely to occur. Stoere believes that the international community has to show progress for the new PM, Fayyad. He made no mention of making contacts with Hamas. Interestingly, Stoere made a cryptic comment at the end of this discussion that it is important for MFA to recognize that ME is really a &sideshow8 for Norway. Norway can be helpful given their contacts but their role should not be overstated.

# AFGHANISTAN AND THE TELEMARK BATTALION

13. (C) Stoere was more optimistic on Afghanistan and believes progress has been made on both the military and the civilian side. One area of concern was the lack of progress on some of the GON priority projects, such as creating a civil service academy to train Afghans. Ambassador Whitney recommended further contact with Mark Ward, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for Asia and the Near East in USAID, who recently visited the MFA and who appreciated the need to develop Afghan human capital. On the security side Ambassador Whitney asked about future Norwegian contributions to ISAF. Stoere clearly indicated not to expect extension of the Norwegian Special Forces in Kabul beyond the current six month commitment. (Note: This was repeated publicly by the Defense Minister this week.) When Ambassador Whitney asked about the possibility of sending the Telemark battalion to Afghanistan Stoere did not immediately reject it but said neutrally that it depended on the assignment, the parameters, and so forth.

14. (C) Despite the reference to opposition to all missile defense systems in the government's platform, Stoere does not see NATO activity on missile defense (MD) as a real problem for the government. He said that comments by the defense spokesman for the Socialist Left party (member of the coalition and fiercely anti-missile defense) that the GON should be more aggressive in its opposition to MD should be viewed as &isolated8 and not reflective of the coalition's position. Stoere reacted somewhat defensively when Ambassador Whitney suggested the PM Stoltenberg,s skeptical comments on MD while during a visit to Russia were unfortunate. Stoere claimed that the media distorted what the PM said but did not disagree when the Ambassador pointed to specific comments that were unhelpful.

## VISIT TO THE WHITE HOUSE

15. (C) Stoere suggested a visit by the Prime Minister to the US with a White House visit could come when Norway opens the Snohvit LNG plant and the first delivery of Norwegian LNG to the U.S. arrives.

### THE NEC

16. (C) The Ambassador briefed Stoere on the progress with the New Embassy Compound and encouraged him to see if there was a mechanism to push the court decision to after the local elections. Stoere agreed with the embassy,s decision to hold the application for a building permit until after local elections.

## COMMENT

17. (C) It is not surprising the Stoere claimed some vindication of his policy initiative on normalizing relations

with Hamas. There was no discussion of possible steps Norway may consider to help the situation. In fact, Deputy FM Raymond Johansen recently stated that Norway was powerless to influence the situation at present. On sending new forces to ISAF, Stoere was equivocal. He did not immediately rule out sending the Telemark battalion, as he did on the question of extending the Special Forces in Kabul, but he was not supportive either. We speculate that the deal struck with the Socialist Left party on the Special Forces was to do a single deployment only. Since there was no deal on the Telemark that leaves it at least theoretically open. END COMMENT Whitney